

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BELGRADE 1359

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (TITO, JOSIP BROZ), YO, US
SUBJ: TITO VISIT -- CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN
POLICY ADVISER

1. AT DINNER LAST NIGHT I HAD A LONG CONVERSATION WITH MALIVOJ MAKSIC, COUNSELOR TO THE PRESIDENT FOR FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS (HIS CLOSEST EQUIVALENT WOULD BE BRZEZINSKI) ABOUT THE UPCOMING TITO VISIT. I REPORT THIS CONVERSATION IN DETAIL ALTHOUGH SURELY A NUMBER OF THE QUESTIONS HE ASKED HAVE BEEN RAISED BY THE YUGOSLAV ADVANCE TEAM NOW IN WASHINGTON.

2. MAKSIC WAS ANXIOUS TO FIND OUT HOW PRESIDENT CARTER CONDUCTS MEETINGS WITH OTHER HEADS OF STATE. DID THE PRESIDENT, HE ASKED, FOLLOW A SET AGENDA AND TALKING POINTS, OR WAS HE PREPARED FOR A MORE FREE FLOWING, LESS STRUCTURED CONVERSATION? IT WAS CLEAR FROM MAKSIC'S COMMENTS THAT THE YUGOSLAVS HOPE FOR A RELAXED EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH A GOOD BIT OF GIVE AND TAKE. I RESPONDED THAT I HAD ONLY SEEN PRESIDENT CARTER IN ACTION TWICE, ONCE WITH KISSINGER IN PLAINS AND ONCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE WITH KARDELJ, AND THAT WHILE THIS WAS NOT MUCH TO GO ON, MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD ENJOY A RELAXED SETTING AND A FREE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. I ADDED
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THAT I DID KNOW THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WAS LOOKING FORWARD VERY MUCH TO GETTING PRESIDENT TITO'S VIEWS ON A WIDE RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES.

3. MAKSIC REMARKED THAT TITO PREFERRED THAT HIS DISCUSSIONS BE WITH A SMALL GROUP RATHER THAN LARGE DELEGATIONS. HE SAID PRESIDENT TITO WOULD ENJOY SOME

TIME ALONE WITH PRESIDENT CARTER, FOLLOWED BY FURTHER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS IN THE COMPANY OF THEIR PRINCIPAL ADVISERS. HE ADDED THAT THIS WAS, OF COURSE, ENTIRELY UP TO THE AMERICAN SIDE; HE ALSO NOTED SARCASTICALLY THAT WHEN TITO MEETS WITH BREZHNEV IT IS ALWAYS IN THE COMPANY OF A LARGE SOVIET DELEGATION. HIS TONE CLEARLY IMPLIED THAT TITO WAS AMUSED BY THIS BUT FAR PREFERRED A DIFFERENT SETTING.

4. MAKSIC ALSO ASKED WHETHER SECRETARIES VANCE AND MINIC WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CONVERSATIONS OR WOULD CONDUCT PARALLEL CONVERSATIONS WHILE PRESIDENTS CARTER AND TITO MET SEPARATELY. AGAIN MAKSIC SAID THAT THIS WAS UP TO THE AMERICAN SIDE, BUT LEFT ME WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE YUGOSLAVS WOULD PREFER PARALLEL DISCUSSIONS. I TOLD MAKSIC I COULD NOT ANSWER HIS QUESTION, BUT I WAS SURE IT WAS AN ISSUE THAT WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON WITH THE YUGOSLAV ADVANCE PARTY.

5. RETURNING TO THE ISSUE OF HOW BEST TO DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE DIALOGUE, MAKSIC SAID THAT IN HIS EXPERIENCE PRESIDENT TITO REACTED BEST TO A PRESENTATION BY HIS COUNTERPART OF HIS POSITION ON A GIVEN ISSUE (WITH EMPHASIS ON THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THAT ISSUE RATHER THAN THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS), FOLLOWED BY A REQUEST OF PRESIDENT TITO THAT
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HE COMMENT ON THE PRESENTATION AND GIVE HIS VIEWS. MAKSIC ALSO SAID THAT TITO ENJOYS BEING ASKED DERIVATIVE QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE POINTS HE HAS MADE. MAKSIC ALSO SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE NO SENSE OF THE PRESSURE OF TIME. "THERE SHOULD NOT BE," HE SAID, "ANY FURTIVE GLANCES AT WATCHES." HE ADDED THAT PRESIDENT TITO UNDERSTANDS THAT PRESIDENT CARTER IS A BUSY MAN AND WILL, THEREFORE, NOT MAKE A "PEST" OF HIMSELF. WE NEED NOT WORRY THAT HE WILL OVERSTAY HIS WELCOME.

6. ON ISSUES, MAKSIC SAID THAT TITO WILL BE MOST INTERESTED IN DISCUSSION OF A) CHINA: OUR ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION THERE, OUR VIEW OF THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND THE FUTURE OF US-PRC RELATIONS.

B) THE MIDDLE EAST.

C) NORTH-SOUTH PROBLEMS AND OUR THOUGHTS ABOUT THE FUTURE.

D) DETENTE: WHILE THE YUGOSLAVS SUPPORT US- USSR DETENTE,

THEY CRITICIZW THE EXCLUSIVITY OF THE RELATIONSHIP.
MAKSIC SAID THAT TITO WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED IN
PRESIDENT CARTER'S THOUGHTS ON THE FUTURE OF DETENTE,
BUT WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO "OPENING UP" THAT
PROCESS TO THE PARRICIPATION OF OTHER NATIONS, E.G.,
YUGOSLAVIA.

E) KOREA: MAKSIC SAID THAT HE RECOGNIZES THE SUBSTANTIAL
DIFFERENCE OF GOY AND USG OUTLOOK ON NORTH KOREA, BUT
BELIEVES THAT PRESIDENT TITO WILL WANT, AT LEAST BEIEFLY,
TO DISCUSS HIS VIEW THAT THE US SHOULD OPEN A DIALOGUE
WITH PYONGYANG. HE SAID THAT KIM IL-SUNG IS "NOT THE
MAN HE USED TO BE" AND THAT THE USG OUGHT TO BE TAKING
ADVANTAGE OF THAT FACT. HE ADDED, "WHO KNOWS WHAT WILL
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HAPPEN AFTER KIM IL-SUNG?"

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EXDIS

7. WHEN I ASKED MAKSIC WHETHER TITO WOULD BE INTERESTED
IN DISCUSSING SOUTHERN AFRICA HE SHRUGGED AND SAID,
"PERHAPS A FEW SENTENCES ON THE AREA WOULD BE WORTHWHILE."
IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF
PRESIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS OF BILATERAL ISSUES, MAKSIC
AGAIN SHRUGGED AND SAID, "5 MINUTES."

8. MAKSIC ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO GET
A COPY OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S WELCOMING REMARKS AT AN

EARLY STAGE SO THAT HE COULD GEAR PRESIDENT TITO'S RESPONSE THERETO. AGAIN HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THIS QUESTION WOULD BE DISCUSSED BY THE ADVANCE TEAM IN WASHINGTON, BUT WANTED TO FLAG IT FOR ME. HE WENT ON TO ADD THAT IT WAS HIS VIEW THAT A FEW FORTHCOMING SENTENCES ON NONALIGNMENT AND YUGOSLAVIA'S POSITION THEREIN DURING PRESIDENT CARTER'S WELCOMING REMARKS WOULD BE VERY WELL RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT TITO. MAKSIC ALSO ASKED THAT HE BE PROVIDED WITH A COPY OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S TOAST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND SAID HE HOPED IT WAS WHITE HOUSE PRACTICE TO EXCHANGE THE TOASTS LONG ENOUGH IN ADVANCE SO THAT THEY COULD BE TRANSLATED AND GIVEN TO EACH GUEST AT THE DINNER, THUS OBTAINING THE NECESSITY FOR ORAL TRANSLATION AT THE DINNER. HE AGAIN HINTED THAT SOME FORTHCOMING REMARKS ON NONALIGNMENT DURING THE TOAST WOULD BE HELPFUL.

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9. MAKSIC SAID THAT TITO BELIEVES OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP IS THE BEST IT HAS EVER BEEN. HE GREATLY VALUES THE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP THAT HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS THROUGH THE "UNPRECEDENTED" EXCHANGE OF LETTERS, AND BELIEVES THIS NEW PRACTICE TO BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO BOTH COUNTRIES. HE WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED WITH THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER ON THE AFRICAN HORN, MAKSIC ADDED, "THIS WILL BE TITO'S LAST VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES AND HE WANTS IT TO BE A SUCCESSFUL ONE; HE VIEWS IT AS CRITICAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE US-YUGOSLAV RELATIONSHIP OVER THE NEXT 5 - 10 YEARS." WITH REGARD TO PRESIDENT TITO'S ATTITUDES TOWARD PRESIDENT CARTER, HE SAID THAT THE FORMER HAS GREAT RESPECT FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S OBVIOUS INTELLIGENCE AND "HUMANITY." HE BELIEVES THAT PRESIDENT CARTER IS TRYING TO REBUILD A NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON FOREIGN POLICY, WHICH EXPLAINS THE ADMINISTRATION'S "SOMETIMES RAPID AND SOMETIMES SURPRISING SHIFTS IN POSITION." MAKSIC SAID THAT TITO BELIEVES THAT THESE "SHIFTS" ARE A NECESSARY CONCOMITANT TO REBUILDING CONSENSUS, BUT IF THEY CONTINUE MUCH LONGER THAT COULD HAVE "UNFORTUNATE" CONSEQUENCES ON WORLD STABILITY.

10. WITH REGARD TO SPECIFIC BILATERAL ISSUES, MAKSIC REMARKED THAT PRESIDENT TITO HOPES THAT THE KRSKO NUCLEAR REACTOR PROBLEM, "WHICH THE PRESIDENT IS PERSONALLY FOLLOWING VERY CLOSELY," COULD EITHER BE RESOLVED OR WELL ON THE WAY TO RESOLUTION BEFORE THE VISIT. I RESPONDED THAT WE HAD A NEGOTIATING TEAM IN BELGRADE NOW FOR DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT AND HOPED

THAT WE COULD FIND AMUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTION.

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I ALSO SAID THAT I THOUGHT THE KRSKO ISSUE AND THE QUESTION OF EX-IM SUPERGUARANTEES WERE THE SERIOUS OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS BETWEEN US. MAKSIC AGREED, BUT SAID THERE WAS A THIRD: THE MILITARY SALES RELATIONSHIP. HE QUICKLY ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS ISSUE APPEARED TO BE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

11. MAKSIC AND I AGREED TO MEET AGAIN PRIOR TO MY DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON ON ORABOUT MARCH 1.

12. COMMENT: IF MAKSIC IS ANY INDICATION (AND I GHINK HE IS), TITO CLEARLY PREFERS TO FOCUS ON INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, LEAVING BILATERAL ISSUES TO OTHERS. I EXPECT, HOWEVER, THAT TITO WILL AT LEAST BRIEFLY MENTION KRSKO AND SUPERGUARANTEES (IF THEY HAVE NOT BEEN SETTLED), AND PERHAPS THE MILITARY SALES RELATIONSHIP. WITH REGARD TO THE LATTER, I HAVE ALREADY SUGGESTED TO WASHINGTON THAT WE MAKE AN EFFORT TO FIND A MAJOR DEFENSIVE SYSTEM WHICH WE COULD OFFER TO THE YUGOSLAVS PRIOR TO THE VISIT. END COMMENT. EAGLEBURGER

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